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The success postulate in belief revision ensures that new evidence (input) is always trusted.
However, admitting uncertain input has been questioned by many researchers. Darwiche
and Pearl argued that strengths of evidence should be introduced to determine the outcome
of belief change, and provided a preliminary definition towards this thought. In this paper,
we start with Darwiche and Pearl’s idea aiming to develop a framework that can capture the
influence of the strengths of inputs with some rational assumptions. To achieve this, we first
define epistemic states to represent beliefs attached with strength, and then present a set
of postulates to describe the change process on epistemic states that is determined by the
strengths of input and establish representation theorems to characterize these postulates.
As a result, we obtain a unique rewarding operator which is proved to be amerging operator
that is in line with many other works. We also investigate existing postulates on belief
merging and compare themwith our postulates. In addition,we show that fromanepistemic
state, a corresponding ordinal conditional function by Spohn can be derived and the result of
combining twoepistemic states is thus reduced to the result of combining twocorresponding
ordinal conditional functions proposed by Laverny and Lang. Furthermore, when reduced to
the belief revision situation, we prove that our results induce all the Darwiche and Pearl’s
postulates as well as the Recalcitrance postulate and the Independence postulate.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Belief revision depicts the process that an agent revises its beliefs when new evidence (we call it input in the rest of the
paper) is received. Often, new input is to some extent conflicting with an agent’s current beliefs. Therefore, belief revision is
a framework to characterize the process of belief change in order to revise the agent’s current beliefs to accommodate new
evidence and to reach a new consistent set of beliefs. Belief revision can be seen as a kind of prioritized belief merging [9]
in the sense that the latest input has the highest priority and so takes the advantage, whilst belief merging formally studies
how to aggregate them into a coherent one when multiple belief bases are given. Namely, the basic distinction between
revision and merging is that revision is asymmetric w.r.t pieces of information and merging is symmetric.
Most studies on belief revision are based on the AGM postulates [1]. In [19], the AGM postulates are formulated in the
propositional setting, denoted as R1–R6. This set of postulates characterizes what a revision operator shall comply. The R1
postulate, also called success postulate, requires that the revision result of a belief set K by a propositionμ (new information)
should always maintainμ being believed. This postulate has been questioned (e.g. [7,14,6]), because it is often undesirable
in situations where an agent’s observation is imprecise or uncertain.
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Practically, 1 at any point in our life, we have a set of beliefs, and we observe. Generally we trust our observations – but
not always. This makes sense: mostly, we trust the evidence of our senses, but sometimes we imagine things, or perform
measurementsor tests carelessly. Therefore, given thatabelief setK andnewinputμarenot consistent,wecannot completely
believeμ despite of its conflict to K , but we need to cooperate them. Of course, in this situation, extra information describing
to what extentμwould be trusted, i.e., strength ofμ, should be provided, which in fact makes the observation an uncertain
input.
This viewpoint was formalized in [11], in which it says, for uncertain inputs, the main question is how to interpret them.
Typically there are two interpretations making sense.
Enforced Uncertainty: The input is taken as a constraint that must be satisfied by the revision result. This is the common
view of revision.
Unreliable input: The input is interpreted as an extra piece of information that may be useful or may be not when refining
the current state. Hence it is not necessarily kept after revision. This is the focus of the paper.
This issue was also implicitly mentioned by Darwiche and Pearl [8]. In the future work section [8], Darwiche and Pearl
argued that revision should allow the outcome of belief change depends on the strength of evidence triggering the change. Hence
the notions of evidence strength and degree of acceptance was introduced. In particular, it was stated that a proposition μ
is accepted by an epistemic state2 Φ to degree m if it takes a piece of evidence ¬μ with strength m to retract μ from Φ .
Formally, they gave the following definition.
Definition 1 [8]. Proposition μ is accepted by an epistemic state Φ to degreem (written Φ |m μ) precisely when
1. Φ | ¬μ;
2. Φ ◦m ¬μ | ¬μ; and
3. Φ ◦m ¬μ | μ.
Here ◦m is a revision operator incorporating valuem.
However, how to design such operators and how to manage a sequence of revision operators ◦m1 , ◦m2 , . . . , ◦mn remain
to be investigated.
Dropping the success postulate led to non-prioritized revision, in which no absolute priority is assigned to the new input
[14]. However, in the current non-prioritized revisions, strengths of new inputs do not play important roles, hence Darwiche
and Pearl’s suggestions are not realized.
In this paper, we follow Darwiche and Pearl’s idea to investigate how we can allow the strength of new input to trigger
the outcome of belief change. Our starting assumptions are:
• Introduce strengths on prior beliefs as well as on new inputs.
• Remove the success postulate.
• Adopt Darwiche and Pearl’s Definition 1 to allow the strengths of beliefs and input to determine the outcome.
From this starting point, we further develop some additional postulates to emphasize the crucial and unique role of
strengths in the strength-determination framework. These postulates include: inputs with a zero strength having no effect
on prior beliefs (B0), inputs with the same strength having the same influence (B4), repeated inputs reinforcing each other
(B5), orders of inputs having no effect on the outcome (B6), etc.
Our initial intention is to allow strengths of prior beliefs and new input to determine the outcome in belief revision,
hoping to obtain some new revision operators. However, with a set of rational postulates proposed for this purpose, we
instead obtained a unique merging operator characterized by this set of postulates. This operator is in fact a rewarding
operator in the sense that it does not give a penalty to dissatisfying worlds, but rewards to satisfying worlds. The rewarding
property makes this operator differs frommost of the existing works, although after normalization, this operator is reduced
to a well-known form, ordinal conditional functions combination in [23,30]. Therefore, the most significant contribution of
the paper is the characterization of this rewarding operator, which provides an answer to Darwiche and Pearl’s problem.
Since our intuition starts from belief revision, but our result is a belief merging operator, to properly reflect this nature,
hereafter, we call the framework in this paper a belief change framework.
It should be noted that uncertain inputs can also be represented as a kind of epistemic states, such as, in [25,2], although
generally epistemic states are used to model agent’s beliefs. Hence in this paper, we also use epistemic states to represent
uncertain inputs. The use of epistemic states to represent new evidence instead of simply using a propositional formula in
1 This paragraph is based on a review comment on our Flairs 2009 submission.
2 In [8] did not clearly define what an epistemic state is, but it can be considered as an agent’s current beliefs together with the relative plausibility orderings
of worlds which are inconsistent with the current beliefs.
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belief revision has already been adopted by many revision frameworks where the advantages of this transition are clearly
stated in [8,4,5,26,18,29,15].
In this paper, we first give a formal definition of epistemic state and then present a set of postulates, denoted as B0–B6, to
characterize operators on iterated belief change. In this framework, both the prior beliefs and new inputs are syntactically
represented by epistemic states. We also provide representation theorems for our postulates.
An interesting phenomena in the research on epistemic revision is that almost all the papers on this topic deploy Spohn’s
ordinal conditional function (OCF) [30] or its variants as illustrative examples for representing prior beliefs and new inputs.
In this paper, we examine the ordinal conditional function and its combination rule [23] in our belief change framework.
We prove that from an epistemic state, a corresponding ordinal conditional function can be derived and that the result of
combining two epistemic states is equivalent to the result of combining two corresponding OCFs. This finding is significant
since it provides a justification for the combination rule of ordinal conditional functions proposed in [23], which is the most
notable combination rule for OCFs so far.
Furthermore, when reduced to the belief revision situation where new inputs must be accepted in the revised belief set,
we prove that our framework can induceDarwiche and Pearl’s (DP’s) belief revision postulates [8] aswell as the Recalcitrance
postulate [29], and the Independence postulate [18].
Since our belief change process is characterized by a merging operator, we also investigate the current belief merging
operators and their postulates, provide a detailed comparison between our postulates and the existing ones.
The rest of thepaper is organized as follows. In Section2, after briefly introducingpreliminaries,wediscuss ourmotivation
on belief change through an example. In Section 3, we provide formal definitions for epistemic states and study iterated
belief change by uncertain inputs as well as a justification for the combination rule proposed for OCFs. In Section 4, we prove
that our postulates can induce all the DP’s iterated belief revision postulates. Finally, we discuss related work and conclude
the paper in Sections 5 and 6.
2. Motivation
Preliminaries:Weconsider a propositional languageLdefinedon afinite setAof propositional atoms,which are denoted
by p, q, r, etc. A propositionφ is constructed by propositional atomswith logic connections¬,∧,∨,→ in the standardway.
An interpretationω (or possible world) is a function thatmapsA onto the set {0, 1}. The set of all possible interpretations on
A is denoted asW . Function ω can be extended to any proposition in L in the usual way, ω : L → {0, 1}. An interpretation
ω is a model of (or satisfies) φ iff ω(φ) = 1, denoted as ω | φ. We useMod(φ) to denote the set of models for φ.
A pre-order≤ defined on any set A is a reflexive and transitive relation over A× A.≤ is total iff for all elements a, b ∈ A,
either a ≤ b or b ≤ a holds. Conventionally, a strict order < and an indifferent relation = can be induced by ≤ such that
∀a, b ∈ A, a < b iff a ≤ b but b ≤ a, and a = b iff a ≤ b and b ≤ a.
Motivations:We use an example to further demonstrate our motivation.
Example1 (Derived fromExample17 in [8]). Wefaceamurder trialwith twomain suspects, JohnandMary. Initially, it appears
that themurderwas committed by one person, hence, our belief can be characterized as: (John∧¬Mary)∨(¬John∧Mary).
As the trial unfolds, however, we receive a very reliable testimony incriminating John, followed by another reliable testimony
incriminatingMary. At this point, how canwe judge these two pieces of evidence in relation to the one-person theory? If we
do not strongly believe in the one-person theory, we should believe that both suspects took part in the murder; whilst if we
believe in the one-person theory more strongly than the testimonies, then based on belief revision, we are forced to believe
thatMary is themurderer nomatter how compelling the evidence against John is (because the evidence incriminatingMary
comes later). This is counterintuitive in two accounts: first, whether we should dismiss the testimony against John should
depend on how strongly we believe in it comparedwith how strongly we believe in the one-person theory; second, whether
we should dismiss the testimony against John should also depend on how strongly we believe in it compared with how
strongly we believe the testimony against Mary (if one-person theory is to be held).
This example is very interesting. First, it shows that without providing the strength of evidence, any belief revision
postulates could lead us to the wrong way, i.e, John can be either a murderer or innocent, any postulate favoring the prior
belief (i.e., the one-person theory)may let a potential murderer escape (John), and any postulate favoring the testimonymay
convict a potentially innocent person (John). Therefore, evidence should also be represented by epistemic states (attached
with strengths). The inspiration of using epistemic state to represent evidence could date back to Jeffrey’swork onprobability
conditionalization [17], where Jeffrey wrote:
in belief updating, the representation of the belief state, the representation of the new information and the result of the update
should be of the same type.
Following this statement, Jeffrey represented all these three items as probability measures (which is a kind of epistemic
state). This idea also inspired Nayak in [28] to represent pieces of evidence as epistemic entrenchment relations (which can
be seen as another kind of epistemic state) in belief revision.
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Second, the above example shows that the underlying principle of belief revision, i.e., that the most recent evidence has
the highest priority, has a major drawback: even if the testimony against John is more compelling than that toMary,Mary is
still themurderer if the one-person theory is believed. Therefore, who is themurderer somehowdepends onwhich evidence
arrives last.
The assumption of giving priority to the most recent evidence is also questioned in [9]. To get around this assumption,
iterated belief revision is taken as a prioritized merging where a set of evidence is prioritized according to their reliability
(strength) rather than the order that these pieces of evidence are received. The revised (or the merged) result is a consistent
belief set such that when a more reliable piece of evidence is inconsistent with a less reliable piece of evidence, the more
reliable evidence should be preserved in the revised belief set. Similar works on reliability handling in belief merging are
also reported in [3,32].
Now we examine Example 1 again by incorporating the strengths of evidence. Suppose that the prior knowledge, one-
person theory, and two new inputs, John is the murderer, and Mary is the murderer (no matter in which order the evidence
(inputs) is collected), are available and have strengths α, β and γ , respectively. With a rational belief change process,
we should find the real murderer(s) according to those strengths. For example, if one-person theory is to be kept (i.e.,
α > max(β, γ )), then the murderer is John if β > γ ; the murderer is Mary if β < γ ; and we do not know who the
murderer is if β = γ . This solution is obviously more intuitive than the result obtained from iterated belief revision where
Mary has to be the murderer under one-person theory regardless how strong the evidence against John is.
From the analysis above, we get the reinforced view that
1. Epistemic states should be used to represent both the prior beliefs and new inputs to manage belief change.
2. It should be the strengths of new inputs, not the order that the inputs are collected, determine the outcome of belief
change.
3. Belief change with uncertain inputs
Our approach on belief change with uncertain inputs is inspired by Darwiche and Pearl’s idea in Definition 1. That is we
want to describe the belief change process that can truly reflect the strengths of prior beliefs and new evidence. Below we
first define epistemic states and then give the corresponding postulates to characterize the process.
3.1. Epistemic states
Ordinal conditional function [30] is commonly regarded as a form of epistemic state.
An ordinal conditional function, also known as a ranking function or a kappa function, commonly denoted as κ , is
a function from a set of possible worlds to the set of ordinal numbers with its belief set defined as Bel(κ) = ϕ where
Mod(ϕ) = {w|κ(w) = 0}. Value κ(w) is understood as the degree of disbelief of world w. So the smaller the κ(w) value,
the more plausible the world is. The ranking value of a proposition μ is defined as:
κ(μ) = minw|μκ(w).
The combination of two ordinal conditional functions κ1 and κ2 is defined in [23] as
(κ1 ⊕ κ2)(w) = κ1(w) + κ2(w) − minw∈W (κ1(w) + κ2(w)). (1)
This is applicable only whenminw∈W (κ1(w) + κ2(w)) < +∞.
We can see that there is a normalization step in the combination of OCFs to make the minimal worlds have kappa value
0. However, when modeling the belief change process, we want to solely concentrate on the nature of the changing process,
and ignore the normalization. So we do not simply use OCFs as our epistemic states but define epistemic states as follows.
Definition 2. An epistemic state Φ is a mapping fromW to Z ∪ {−∞,∞}where Z is the set of integers.
Obviously, this definition follows the spiritsof OCF and the epistemic state defined in [26] (in which it was defined as a
mapping fromW to the set of ordinals, and such a definition was also implied in [38]).
Based on Definition 2, if a possible worldw is assigned with a larger integer than another worldw′, then it is interpreted
as that w is believed more plausible than w′.
Nevertheless, two syntactically different epistemic states could have the same semanticmeanings, as stated below.
Definition 3. Two epistemic states Φ and Ψ are considered semantically equivalent if and only if ∃k ∈ Z , s.t., ∀w ∈ W ,
Φ(w) = Ψ (w) + k.
That is, the value assigned to w in an epistemic state only has a relative meaning w.r.t. values assigned to other possible
worlds in the same state.Hence after normalization,we canget a semantically equivalent epistemic state. For the sake of clear
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presentation of postulates, unless otherwise specified, we do not consider normalizing semantically equivalent epistemic
states, and just treat them as a single epistemic state.
Definition 4. LetΦ be an epistemic state, thebelief set ofΦ , denoted as Bel(Φ), is defined as Bel(Φ) = ψ whereMod(ψ) =
min(W,≤Φ). Here≤Φ is a total pre-order relation onW such that w1 ≤Φ w2 iff Φ(w1) ≥ Φ(w2).
Here we can see that the belief set derived from an OCF or an epistemic state defined in [26] is the same as that in Definition
4, i.e., the belief set has all the most plausible worlds as its models, although in [26], the most plausible worlds are assigned
value 0 while in this paper, the most plausible worlds are assigned with the largest values comparing to the other worlds.
In addition, we have that ignoring the normalization step will not affect the belief sets of the resulted epistemic state based
on Eq. 1.
Another major difference between our epistemic state and some other definitions [26] is that the range of our epistemic
states is Z ∪ {−∞,∞} instead of ordinals. Once again, these two differences enable us to avoid the normalization step.
Φ can be extended to proposition formulae as follows.
Definition 5 (Extension of epistemic state). LetΦ be an epistemic state, thenΦ can be extended to any propositional formula
μ such that Φ(μ) = maxw|μ(Φ(w)).
Note that here we usemax instead ofmin, because in this paper a possible world with a higher value is more important than
the one with a lower value whilst for epistemic states in [26] and OCFs, the situation is opposite.
Let fΦ(μ) = Φ(μ)−Φ(¬μ), we call fΦ(μ) the strength of preference onμwhich is interpreted as the relative preference
ofμ over¬μ. The notion of strength of preference is not new. In [31], it stated “The strength of preference for a proposition
X over a proposition Y is the expectation (based on an agent’s probabilistic beliefs) that a world in X is better than a world
in Y .” Our notion follows a similar explanation. For distinction, we call Φ(μ) the weight of μ.
Now we consider a special case of epistemic state.
Definition 6. An epistemic state Φ is called a simple epistemic state iff ∃μ such that
Φ(w) =
⎧⎨
⎩
m for w | μ,
0 for w | μ.
Herem is an integer and we simply write Φ as (μ,m).
Simple epistemic states are introduced to make the representation of postulates in the next subsection simpler. Note
that any epistemic state in which possible worlds can be divided into two sets with two different values assigned can
be transformed into semantically equivalent simple epistemic states as discussed above. In classic belief revision, most
commonly the new input is a propositional formulaμwhich could be seen as a special case of simple epistemic state (μ,m)
wherem is a positive integer.
For a simple epistemic state Φ = (μ,m), we have Bel(Φ) = μ if m > 0; Bel(Φ) = ¬μ if m < 0, and Bel(Φ) =  if
m = 0. It also shows that ifm = 0, this simple epistemic state is totally ignorant.
In the next section, for illustration and simplicity, wewill first consider using simple epistemic states to represent simple
uncertain inputs and then extend to general cases where we use any epistemic states to represent general uncertain inputs.
3.2. Postulates
In this section, we propose some rational postulates for belief change by epistemic states and then give representing
theorems for these postulates.
Following [19,8], we also use the notation form(w1,w2, . . .) to denote a proposition μ which has w1,w2, . . . as its
models, that is, Mod(μ) = {w1,w2, . . .}. By abuse of notations, we also use form(A) to denote a proposition μ such that
Mod(μ) = A. We also assume that when an epistemic stateΦ is embedded in a propositional formula, it stands for Bel(Φ),
e.g. Φ ∧ ψ means Bel(Φ) ∧ ψ ; Φ | μ means Bel(Φ) | μ andMod(Φ) = Mod(Bel(Φ)), etc.
A belief change operator associating an epistemic state and a new uncertain input (represented in the form of epistemic
state) to a resulting epistemic state must satisfy certain constraints formalized as postulates. Nowwe investigate what pos-
tulates should be. Since the key characteristics of belief change is to allow strengths of the current beliefs and new uncertain
inputs to determine the outcome, we propose the following seven postulates (with their explanations) to characterize belief
change.
B0 Φ ◦ (μ, 0) = Φ for any consistent μ.
Explanation: This postulate states that if an agent obtains ignorant information, then its beliefs shall not be changed. Here
(μ, 0) represents a totally ignorant input as discussed above.
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B1 If fΦ(μ) > m, thenΦ ◦ (¬μ,m) | μ; if fΦ(μ) < m, thenΦ ◦ (¬μ,m) | ¬μ; if fΦ(μ) = m, thenΦ ◦ (¬μ,m) | μ
and Φ ◦ (¬μ,m) | ¬μ.
Explanation: This intuitively follows Definition 1, which shows that it should be the strengths of agent’s current beliefs
and new input that determine the outcome of belief change.When fΦ(μ) = m and new input gives (¬μ,m), then neither
μ nor¬μ should be believed. That is because the prior beliefs preferμwith strengthmwhilst the input prefers¬μwith
the same strength, then no conclusion can be drawn.
B2 If Φ ∧ μ is satisfiable, then Φ ◦ (μ,m) ≡ Φ ∧ μ whenm > 0.
Explanation: If a new input is consistent with an agent’s current beliefs, then the agent incorporates the new input into
its beliefs.
B3 If μ is satisfiable, then Φ ◦ (μ,m) is an epistemic state.
Explanation: If a new input is consistent, then a new epistemic state should be obtained after belief change. With this
postulate, without loss of generality, we assume that all new inputs considered in this paper are consistent.
B4 If Φ1(w1) = Φ2(w2) and (μ1,m)(w1) = (μ2, n)(w2), then (Φ1 ◦ (μ1,m))(w1) = (Φ2 ◦ (μ2, n))(w2).
Explanation: If two agents hold the same (prior) degree of beliefs (strength) on two possible worlds w1 and w2, and two
new inputs they receive also have the same strength on these two worlds, respectively, then both agents shall still have
the same degree of belief on the twoworlds after changing their prior beliefs with new inputs. This postulate is intuitively
similar to the Neutrality with respect to the intensity scale condition proposed in [10] which says in a social choice scenario,
an aggregation function should not depend on the semantic meanings of a set of social choice functions, but only focus on
their intensities (numerical values in [0, 1]) of choices.
B5 Φ ◦ (μ,m) ◦ (μ, n) = Φ ◦ (μ,m + n).
Explanation: The strength of beliefs of a proposition is reinforced when multiple new inputs supporting it are received.
This postulate requires that these inputs are independently obtained. A typical scenario of this postulate is in a rumor
spreading process. Cumulative rumors usually destroy people’s current beliefs. This postulate is also in spirit similar to the
Dempster’s combination rule in the Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence. When the rule is applied to combine consistent
distinguished pieces of evidence, it has a reinforcement effect.
B6 Φ ◦ (μ,m) ◦ (ψ, n) = Φ ◦ (ψ, n) ◦ (μ,m).
Explanation:Theorderof inputs (received) shallnot influence theoutcomeofbelief change. ThisandB1 togetherdetermine
the main difference between a belief change operator and belief revision operator.
With these postulates, we have the following results.
Proposition 1. If a belief change operator ◦ satisfies B0 and B4, then we have (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) for w | ¬μ.
This proposition shows that a new input has no effect on possible worlds which it does not support.
Proposition 2. If a belief change operator ◦ satisfies B0, B1 and B4, and if w | Bel(Φ), then we have
Mod(Φ ◦ (form(w),m)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Mod(Φ) if m < fΦ(¬form(w)),
Mod(Φ) ∪ {w} if m = fΦ(¬form(w)),
{w} if m > fΦ(¬form(w)).
This proposition states that when the degree of the input supporting w increases, possible worlds w will be gradually
becoming a model of the prior belief set and could even becoming the unique model of the final belief set, even though it
may not be a model of the prior belief initially.
Now we give the following representation theorem for these postulates.
Theorem 1. A belief change operator ◦ satisfies postulates B0–B6 precisely when
∀w, (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + (μ,m)(w). (2)
This theorem3 describes the belief change process when a new input is represented as a simple epistemic state.
This postulate suggests that the operator depicted by the postulates is generally a shifting operator, and so is in line with
many existing approaches, e.g. [30,13,38,34,35,26,20,36,21,37,18]. However, Theorem 1 shows that this operator rewards
any worlds with the strengths provided by the input, but does not penalize any worlds which are not in the belief set of the
input, whilst existing shifting operators will give penalties to the worlds dissatisfying with the input.
3 Here we need to point out that (+∞) + (−∞) is undefined. It could be any value in Z ∪ {+∞,−∞}. Generally, this situation will not occur, since −∞
means absolutely impossible while+∞means totally sure. Basically a possible world cannot be considered both impossible and sure.
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From this theorem, we get that if an epistemic state Φ can be represented as:
Φ(w) = mi iff w | μi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where μis are pairwise contradictory, then we have
∀w, Φ(w) = ((μ1,m1) ◦ . . . ◦ (μn,mn))(w).
Nowwecanextend this theoremto thecase that anewinput isnot restricted toonlya simpleepistemic state. Toaccommodate
this extension, we need to naturally extend postulate B6 to B6* as follows:
B6* Φ1 ◦ Φ2 ◦ Φ3 = Φ1 ◦ Φ3 ◦ Φ2.
Then we have the following representation theorem.
Theorem 2. A belief change operator ◦ satisfies postulates B0–B5 and B6* precisely when
∀w, (Φ ◦ Φ ′)(w) = Φ(w) + Φ ′(w). (3)
This theorem reveals that with the definition of epistemic states in Definition 2, only the rewarding operator can serve the
true purpose of achieving belief change is triggered by the strength of evidence.
Example 2 (Example 1 revisited). Let the prior epistemic state about the initial one-person theory be Φ such that
Φ(John,¬Mary) = α,Φ(¬John,Mary) = α, α > 0,
Φ(John,Mary) = 0, Φ(¬John,¬Mary) = −∞.
Let the two testimonies incriminating JohnandMarybe represented, respectively, by two simple epistemic states as (John, β)
and (Mary, γ ) where β, γ > 0. Let ◦ be a belief change operator on epistemic state Φ satisfying postulates B0–B6, then
applying ◦ to these three epistemic states, we have the final epistemic state ΦJM as
ΦJM(John,¬Mary) = α + β,ΦJM(¬John,Mary) = α + γ,
ΦJM(John,Mary) = β + γ,ΦJM(¬John,¬Mary) = −∞.
If the one-person theory is the most reliable evidence, i.e., α > max(β, γ ), then we have both
ΦJM(John,¬Mary) > ΦJM(John,Mary)
ΦJM(¬John,Mary) > ΦJM(John,Mary)
which show that themurderer is one of themwhich is intuitivelywhatwewant to get. Furthermore, who exactly committed
the crime is basedon the strengths of the evidenceβ vs.γ .Whenβ > γ , i.e.,whenΦJM(John,¬Mary) > ΦJM(¬John,Mary),
then John is the murderer, when γ > β , i.e., whenΦJM(John,¬Mary) < ΦJM(¬John,Mary), then Mary is the murderer. An
interesting situation is when β = γ , we cannot decide who is the murderer and this is intuitively correct also, because the
evidence is not against one over the other.
On the other hand, if α < min(β, γ ), then the result of belief change (John ∧ Mary) suggests that both John and Mary
are murderers which is also intuitively explainable.
This example shows that belief change operators satisfying postulates B0–B6 do allow the strengths of evidence play an
essential role in determining the outcome of belief change.
3.3. A justification on OCF combination
Below we prove that our definition of epistemic state and the belief change rule (Φ ◦ Φ ′)(w) = Φ(w) + Φ ′(w) given
in Theorem 2 can induce the ordinal conditional function and its combination method defined by Eq. 1, respectively. Thus,
our postulates justify the rationale for the combination of ordinal conditional functions using Eq. 1.
Definition 7. LetΦ be an epistemic state defined in Definition 2. We define κΦ : L → Z as a corresponding function forΦ
such that
κΦ(μ) = maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − Φ(μ). (4)
For (+∞) − (+∞) and (−∞) − (−∞), the results are undefined as explained early.
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We have the following immediate result.
Proposition 3. Let Φ be an epistemic state and κΦ be its corresponding function based on Definition 7, then κΦ is an ordinal
conditional function.
The following theorem shows that the result of changing an epistemic state Φ with an uncertain input represented by
Φ ′ is equivalent to the result of combining the two corresponding functions derived from Φ and Φ ′, respectively.
Theorem 3. LetΦ andΦ ′ be two epistemic states andΦ ◦Φ ′ be the resulting epistemic state after belief change. Let κΦ , κΦ ′ , and
κΦ◦Φ ′ be their corresponding functions, respectively, thenwe have∀w, κΦ◦Φ ′(w) = (κΦ ⊕κΦ ′)(w)where⊕ is the combination
operator in Eq. 1.
The correspondence between epistemic states and OCFs given by Theorem 3 is intuitively illustrated as follows:
(Φ ◦ Φ ′)(w) = Φ(w) + Φ ′(w)
↓ ↓ ↓
κΦ◦Φ ′(w) = (κΦ ⊕ κΦ ′)(w).
Example 3. A father believed that his child X is clever (c) and very honest (h). The prior epistemic state Φ can then be
constructed as
Φ(c, h) = 15, Φ(¬c, h) = 12, Φ(c,¬h) = 5, Φ(¬c,¬h) = 0.
Now someone told him that X told a lie. This new input can be captured by a simple epistemic state (¬h, 2). Applying the
belief change operator ◦ to Φ with new input (¬h, 2), the father obtained his revised epistemic state, Φ¬h = Φ ◦ (¬h, 2),
as
Φ¬h(c, h) = 15, Φ¬h(¬c, h) = 12, Φ¬h(c,¬h) = 7, Φ¬h(¬c,¬h) = 2,
which shows that although he still believes that his child is largely honest, however his belief in the child’s dishonesty has
been increased.
Based on Definition 7, the corresponding κ functions for Φ , (¬h, 2), and Φ¬h can be obtained as follows:
κΦ(c, h) = 0, κΦ(¬c, h) = 3, κΦ(c,¬h) = 10, κΦ(¬c,¬h) = 15,
κ¬h(h) = 2, κ¬h(¬h) = 0,
κΦ¬h(c, h) = 0, κΦ¬h(¬c, h) = 3,
κΦ¬h(c,¬h) = 8, κΦ¬h(¬c,¬h) = 13.
It is easy to verify that κΦ¬h(w) = κΦ(w) + κ¬h(w) − minw∈W (κΦ(w) + κ¬h(w)) for any possible world w.
4. Belief change vs. belief revision
4.1. Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates on iterated belief revision
To demonstrate the inadequacy of iterated belief revision, in [8] Darwiche and Pearl deployed a set of examples to
show how counterintuitive results will appear if AGM postulates are to be followed. They recommended that to ensure
the rational preservation of conditional beliefs 4 during (iterated) belief revision, a revision process shall be carried out on
epistemic states 5 rather than on their belief sets. With this intention, epistemic states are used to represent an agent’s
original beliefs and a new inputs which is taken as a propositional formula. Correspondingly, Darwiche and Pearl modified
the AGM postulates (rephrased by Katsuno and Mendelzon in [19] as R1–R6) to obtain a set of revised postulates (R*1–R*6)
for iterated epistemic revision. Let ◦r be a revision operator which revises an epistemic state with a propositional formula
to a new epistemic state, the revised postulates are
R*1 Ψ ◦r μ implies μ.
R*2 If Ψ ∧ μ is satisfiable, then Ψ ◦r μ ≡ Ψ ∧ μ.
R*3 If μ is satisfiable, then Ψ ◦r μ is also satisfiable.
R*4 If Ψ1 = Ψ2 and μ1 ≡ μ2, then Ψ1 ◦r μ1 ≡ Ψ2 ◦r μ2.
4 Again, in this section, the definition of epistemic state follows DP’s setting as mentioned in footnote 2.
5 Letψ and α be two propositional formulae and let ◦r be a belief revision operator, then the revision ofψ by α is a new propositional formula and is denoted
as ψ ◦r α. β|α is called a conditional belief of ψ if ψ ◦r α | β [8].
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R*5 (Ψ ◦r μ) ∧ φ implies Ψ ◦r (μ ∧ φ).
R*6 If (Ψ ◦r μ) ∧ φ is satisfiable, then Ψ ◦r (μ ∧ φ) implies (Ψ ◦r μ) ∧ φ.
In the above postulates, Ψ (or Ψ1, Ψ2) stands for an epistemic state and μ and φ are propositional formulae. Ψ ◦r μ
is an epistemic state after revising Ψ with revision operator ◦r by μ. When an epistemic state (e.g. Ψ ) is embedded in a
propositional formula, it is used to stand for its belief set 6 (e.g. Bel(Ψ )) not an epistemic state for simplification purpose.
For example, Ψ ∧ φ means Bel(Ψ ) ∧ φ.
To regulate iterated epistemic revision to preserve conditional beliefs, Darwiche and Pearl gave the following four addi-
tional postulates which are for four disjoint types of conditional beliefs.
C1 If α | μ, then (Ψ ◦r μ) ◦r α ≡ Ψ ◦r α.
C2 If α | ¬μ, then (Ψ ◦r μ) ◦r α ≡ Ψ ◦r α.
C3 If Ψ ◦r α | μ, then (Ψ ◦r μ) ◦r α | μ.
C4 If Ψ ◦r α | ¬μ, then (Ψ ◦r μ) ◦r α | ¬μ.
Ψ ◦r α | β here stands for Bel(Ψ ◦r α) | β .
Two representation theorems are given to characterize these two sets of postulates, which we call DP postulates in the
rest of the paper. But first, we introduce the definition of faithful assignment.
Definition 8 [8]. Let W be the set of all worlds (interpretations) of a propositional language L and suppose that the belief
set of any epistemic state belongs to L. A function that maps each epistemic state Φ to a total pre-order≤rΦ on worldsW is
said to be a faithful assignment if and only if:
1. w1,w2 | Φ only if w1 =rΦ w2.
2. w1 | Φ and w2 | Φ only if w1 <rΦ w2.
3. Φ = Ψ only if≤rΦ=≤rΨ .
Theorem 4 [8]. A revision operator ◦r satisfies postulates R*1–R*6 precisely when there exists a faithful assignment that maps
each epistemic state Φ to a total pre-order ≤rΦ such that:
Mod(Φ ◦r μ) = min(Mod(μ),≤rΦ).
This representation theorem shows that the revised belief is determined by μ and the total pre-order associated with Φ .
Theorem 5 [8]. Suppose that a revision operator ◦r satisfies postulates R*1–R*6. The operator satisfies postulates C1–C4 iff the
operator and its corresponding faithful assignment satisfy:
CR1 If w1 | μ and w2 | μ, then w1 ≤rΦ w2 iff w1 ≤rΦ◦rμ w2.
CR2 If w1 | ¬μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 ≤rΦ w2 iff w1 ≤rΦ◦rμ w2.
CR3 If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 <rΦ w2 only if w1 <rΦ◦rμ w2.
CR4 If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 ≤rΦ w2 only if w1 ≤rΦ◦rμ w2.
This representation theoremstates that an epistemic revisionoperator◦r satisfies postulate Ci iff conditionCRi is satisfied,
1 ≤ i ≤ 4.
4.2. Belief change versus belief revision
In this section, we want to prove that when reducing to the belief revision situation, our result should derive all the
belief revision postulates including Darwiche and Pearl’s belief revision postulates R*1–R*6 and C1–C4 [8]. Because the
essential difference between belief change and belief revision is that belief revision takes the most recent input as the most
reliable one. From our view of belief change, belief revision always assigns a reasonably larger strength of preference to
the most recent input. For instance, given a prior epistemic state Φ , it is possible to create a new input (μ,m∗) such that
m∗ = maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − minw∈W (Φ(w)) + 1, then the strength of new input μ is stronger than the strength of belief on
any subset A of 2W . To simulate an iterated belief revision process with evidence sequenceμ1, . . . , μn using a belief change
operator, we only need to letm1 = m∗, andmi = 2i−1 ∗m1, 1 < i ≤ n to ensure that each new input always has a stronger
strength than any previous inputs. For convenience, we name (μ,m) revision input ifm ≥ m∗. Intuitively, a revision input
6 In [8], it demonstrated that each epistemic state has an associated belief set which characterizes the set of propositions that the agent is committed to at any
given time.
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means that the strength of new input is large enough to make the information implied in the input being influential to the
outcome of the revision.
Theorem 6. Let Φ be an epistemic state and (μ,m) be a revision input, then a belief change operator ◦ satisfying postulates
B0–B6 guarantees the existence of a faithful assignment which maps each epistemic state Φ to a total pre-order Φ such that:
Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)) = min(Mod(μ),Φ).
This theorem, accompanied with Theorem 4, shows that the belief set obtained from belief change on an epistemic state
Φ with revision input (μ,m) is equivalent to the belief set obtained from belief revision on Φ with formula μ. That is
Bel(Φ ◦ (μ,m)) = Bel(Φ ◦r μ).
Theorem 7. Let Φ be an epistemic state and (μ,m) be a revision input, a belief change operator ◦ satisfies postulates B0–B6
implies the following:
CR1* If w1 | μ and w2 | μ, then w1 Φ w2 iff w1 Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
CR2* If w1 | ¬μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 Φ w2 iff w1 Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
CR3* If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 ≺Φ w2 only if w1 ≺Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
CR4* If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 Φ w2 only if w1 Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
CRi* corresponds to CRi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. This theorem reveals that our belief change postulates subsume Darwiche–Pearl’s
iterated belief revision postulates C1–C4. Theorems 6 and 7 together show that our set of postulates is indeed an extension
of iterated belief revision when equipped with strengths.
We can also prove that our postulates induce the following Recalcitrance (Rec) postulate [29] and Independence (Ind)
postulate [18] when reduced to belief revision situation.
Rec If α | ¬μ, then (Φ ◦r μ) ◦r α | μ.
Ind If Φ ◦r ¬α | ¬μ, then (Φ ◦r μ) ◦r ¬α | μ.
Semantically, given ◦r satisfying R*1–R*6, postulate Rec and Ind correspond to the following conditions [29,18].
RecR If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 <rΦ◦rμ w2.
IndR If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 ≤rΦ w2 only if w1 <rΦ◦rμ w2.
The following theorem shows our postulates truly induce the Recalcitrance postulate and the Independence postulate.
Theorem 8. Let Φ be an epistemic state and (μ,m) be a revision input, a belief change operator ◦ satisfying postulates B0–B6
implies the following:
RecR* If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 ≺Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
IndR* If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 Φ w2 only if w1 ≺Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
This is not surprising as the Recalcitrance postulate implies the Independence postulate which in turn implies C3 and C4.
In summary, if the strength of new information is large enough (hence such information is a piece of revision evidence),
then the belief change operator reduces to a belief revision operator. This truly reflects the strength of evidence triggers the
change.
5. Related work
In this section, we discuss and compare with some related work.
5.1. Iterated conditional revision
In [21], epistemic states are defined as logic formulae equippedwith a numerical data structure called the conditional val-
uation functionwhich generalizes OCFs andprobability functions, and then iterated conditional belief revision is axiomatized
and investigated. Iterated conditional revision has also been studied by Weydert within the ranking measure framework
[35,37] in which epistemic states are represented as ranking measures [33] which take the ordinal conditional functions as
a special case. Both Kern-Isberner’s and Weydert’s work characterize and elaborate approaches to iterated revision that are
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also shifting approaches similar to the approach proposed in this paper (i.e., Theorem 1). However, both of the above two
frameworks still fall into the standard revision protocol in which the success postulate is followed.
5.2. Belief merging – Konieczny and Pino-Pérez postulates
In [22], a set of postulates on the merging of flat knowledge bases was presented. A (flat) knowledge base K is a finite set
of propositions. K is consistent iff there is at least one interpretation that satisfies all propositions in K .
A knowledge profile E is a multi-set of knowledge bases such that E = {K1, K2, . . . , Kn} where Ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a
knowledge base.
⊔
E = K1⊔ · · ·⊔ Kn denotes the set union of Kis and ∧ E = K1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kn denotes the conjunction
of knowledge bases Kis of E. E is called consistent iff
∧
E is consistent. E1 ↔ E2 denotes that there is a bijection g from
E1 = {K11 , . . . , K1n } to E2 = {K21 , . . . , K2n } such that  g(K) ↔ K .
An operator  is a mapping from knowledge profiles to knowledge bases. And  is a merging operator iff it satisfies the
following postulates.
A1 (E) is consistent.
A2 If E is consistent, then (E) = ∧ E.
A3 If E1 ↔ E2, then  (E1) ↔ (E2).
A4 If K ∧ K ′ is not consistent, then (K⊔ K ′)  K .
A5 (E1) ∧ (E2)  (E1⊔ E2).
A6 If (E1) ∧ (E2) is consistent, then (E1⊔ E2)  (E1) ∧ (E2).
According to [22], A1–A6 can be interpreted as follows. A1 says that we always want to extract some information from
the knowledge profile. A2 assures that if all the knowledge bases are consistent, then the consistent information will be the
merging result. A3 implies merging is irrelevant of syntax. A4 demonstrates that the merging is fair. A5 and A6 together
states that if we could find two subgroups which agree on at least one alternative, then the result of global arbitration will
be exactly those alternatives the two subgroups agree on.
Evidently, we can see that A1 is similar to B3, A2 is similar to B2. Since our postulates are on epistemic states which are
attached with strengths, there is no direct counterpart of A3, but B4 can somehow be seen as a quantitative extension of
A3. B1 is a refined version of A4. That is, in a pure logic-based framework, it is only possible to determine that K and K ′
are inconsistent, but it is normally impossible to quantify to what degree they are inconsistent. 7 So A4 only says that no
preference shouldbegiven to either of theknowledgebases if they are inconsistent,which is questionedbymany researchers.
However, in our framework, strengths of prior beliefs and new inputs serve as an elaborated tool to tell explicitly the degree
of inconsistency, so it is possible for us to define amuchmore refined postulate B1 than postulate A4. Note that in A5 and A6,
E1 and E2 are two knowledge profiles, each containing a set of knowledge bases, hence, it is possible to perform themerging
of each knowledge profile first (i.e., (E1), (E2)) and then their merging results can be finally merged. However, in our
framework, both the prior beliefs and the new input are in fact represented as an individual epistemic state, hence no such
extra actions could be taken for managing them, prior to their merging. Therefore, we cannot define extensions for A5 and
A6 in our framework. However, there is a common gesture between belief merging and our belief change framework, that
is the step by stepmerging implied by A5 and A6, which, to some extent, is exhibited by B5 and B6 about step by step belief
change.
In [26], epistemic state merging properties are studied where epistemic states are in fact OCFs. Since these properties are
direct quantitative counterparts of the above Konieczny and Pino-Pérez postulates, here we omit the detailed comparison
with these properties. Remarkably, an operator similar to the rewarding operator in Theorem 2 is also mentioned as an
example of epistemic state merging operator in [26].
5.3. Multiple belief change
Multiple belief change, includingmultiple contraction [12,39] andmultiple revision [39], is summarized in [40] in which
these two approaches are mutually transformable. Multiple belief revision considers situations that more than one input is
obtained simultaneously and hence all these inputs are used for revision.
Postulate B6 seems to imply that our framework entails a multiple revision process. However, there are some significant
differences. Themajordifference is thatmultiple revisiondoesnot consider strengths. In addition, new inputs are represented
by sentences in multiple revision whilst in our framework, all information is represented by epistemic states. Furthermore,
multiple belief change is still a revision such that a new input should be respected while our framework does not follow this.
7 Although there are measures of inconsistency of a single knowledge base [16,27], there are no standardmeasures about the degree of inconsistency between
two knowledge bases.
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5.4. Non-prioritized belief revision
Our belief change framework can be seemas closely related to the non-prioritized belief revision (cf. [14] for an overview).
However, similar to themultiple revision discussedpreviously, strengthdoes not play a role in non-prioritized belief revision.
In addition, non-prioritized revision is a sentence-based revision process which is different from our epistemic state based
change process.
5.5. Revision as prioritized merging
In [9], it was proposed that belief revision could be considered as prioritized merging. Essentially, [9] still studies the
standard revision strategy that the success postulates is retained, but the revision strategy was viewed from a merging
perspective. In [9], strengths were not considered in revision and merging. However, the necessity of using strengths in
revision and merging to achieve more complex objectives was discussed.
5.6. Iterated revision on epistemic states
In [25], an iterated revision framework on epistemic states is proposed in which a more general definition on epistemic
states was defined which takes the definition of epistemic states in this paper as a special case. Although strengths are
introduced in the definition of epistemic states in [25], the basic framework is still performing revision in nature which
respects the new input whilst the belief change framework proposed in this paper does not. The commonality of the two
papers is that new inputs should be represented by epistemic states, not logical formulae.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a framework for managing belief change with uncertain inputs, in which prior beliefs and
inputs are both represented in the form of epistemic states. We proposed a set of postulates to characterize belief change
operators. We also provided representation theorems for our postulates which show that our belief change operators are in
fact rewarding operators. In addition, we show that these postulates can be seen as a justification of the combination of two
OCFs [23].
When reducing to the iterated belief revision situation by Darwiche and Pearl (where a new input is a propositional
formula), our postulates induce all of DP’s postulates. Moreover, we also proved that the Recalcitrance postulate in [29] and
the Independence postulate in [18] can be induced from our postulates as well.
Belief revision requires that the most recent evidence is treated as the most reliable one. When it is not the case, belief
revision cannot be applied, as studied in [7,14,6,9]. However, these approaches cannot achieve the goal that the outcome of
belief change depends on the strength of evidence triggering the change 8 [8]. Our approach, inspired by this observation, tackles
this problem by deploying epistemic states tomodel new inputs and their strengths, so that the strengths of evidence trigger
belief change.
As Kern-Isberner’s [21] and Weydert’s [35,37] work also deal with shifting iterated revision, it is an interesting future
work to compare the axioms used in these frameworks with the axioms used in this paper.
Postulate B4 is somehow a rather strong postulate which restricts the combination of epistemic states to be point-wise
combination. Further research on how to weaken this postulate would be interesting and worthwhile.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By setting Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ , w1 = w2 = w, (μ1,m) = (μ,m) and (μ2, n) = (μ, 0), from B4, we
get (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = (Φ ◦ (μ, 0))(w). From B0, we have (Φ ◦ (μ, 0))(w) = Φ(w), thus (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let μ = form(w) and w′ | Φ , then we have
fΦ(¬μ) = Φ(¬μ) − Φ(μ)
=maxw∗|¬μ(Φ(w∗)) − maxw∗|μ(Φ(w∗))
=maxw∗ =w(Φ(w∗)) − Φ(w)
= Φ(w′) − Φ(w).
8 That is one of the reasons why this paper uses the phrase belief change in the title.
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As ◦ satisfies B0 and B4, then from Proposition 1, we know that ∀w∗ = w, (Φ ◦ (form(w),m))(w∗) = Φ(w∗). Thus only
the epistemic strength of w is changed, andMod(Φ ◦ (form(w),m)) depends on the value (Φ ◦ (form(w),m))(w).
From B1, we have
1. If m < Φ(w′) − Φ(w) = fΦ(¬μ), then Φ ◦ (form(w),m) | ¬form(w), hence w | (Φ ◦ (form(w),m)). Then
Mod(Φ ◦ (form(w),m)) = Mod(Φ).
2. If m = Φ(w′) − Φ(w) = fΦ(¬μ), then Φ ◦ (form(w),m) | ¬form(w) implies w | (Φ ◦ (form(w),m)), and
Φ ◦ (form(w),m) | form(w) implies that there exists some w∗ = w such that w∗ | (Φ ◦ (form(w),m)). Recall
(Φ ◦ (form(w),m))(w∗) = Φ(w∗) as w∗ = w, we getMod(Φ ◦ (form(w),m)) = Mod(Φ) ∪ {w}.
3. Ifm > Φ(w′)−Φ(w) = fΦ(¬μ), thenΦ ◦(form(w),m) | form(w), hencew is the onlymodel ofΦ ◦(form(w),m).
ThenMod(Φ ◦ (form(w),m)) = {w}.
Proof of Theorem 1. (⇒) Suppose there is a belief change operator ◦ satisfies postulates B0–B6. We will show (Φ ◦
(μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + (μ,m)(w) holds by the following steps:
Step 1. We show that (Φ ◦ (form(w),m))(w) ≥ Φ(w) + m if w ∈ Mod(Φ) andm ≥ 0.
The situation m = 0 is straightforward by B0. For m ≥ 1, first we prove that (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1))(w) ≥ Φ(w) + 1. We
consider the following two cases:
1. w ∈ Mod(Φ) and there exists another possible world w′ ∈ Mod(Φ).
Asw ∈ Mod(Φ), thenΦ ∧ form(w) is satisfiable (w is its uniquemodel), hence from B2, we haveΦ ◦ (form(w), 1) ≡
Φ ∧ form(w). So we get that Mod(Φ ◦ (form(w), 1)) = {w}. Then we have (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1))(w) > (Φ ◦
(form(w), 1))(w′). From Proposition 1, we get (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1))(w′) = Φ(w′). As both w,w′ ∈ Mod(Φ), we have
Φ(w) = Φ(w′). Sofinallywehave (Φ◦(form(w), 1))(w) > Φ(w), hencewehave (Φ◦(form(w), 1))(w) ≥ Φ(w)+1.
2. Mod(Φ) = {w}.
Let μ = ¬form(w), and t = fΦ(form(w)) > 0, then from B1, we have Φ ◦ (μ, t) | μ and Φ ◦ (μ, t) | ¬μ.
Φ ◦ (μ, t) | μ implies that Mod(Φ ◦ (μ, t)) ∩ Mod(¬μ) = ∅, but Mod(¬μ) = Mod(form(w)) = {w}, so it
should be Mod(Φ ◦ (μ, t)) ∩ Mod(¬μ) = {w}, and hence w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ, t)). Similarly, Φ ◦ (μ, t) | ¬μ
implies that there exists some w′ ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ, t)) and w′ = w. Hence a similar proof as case 1 gives that
(Φ ◦ (μ, t) ◦ (form(w), 1))(w) ≥ (Φ ◦ (μ, t))(w) + 1. From B6, we have (Φ ◦ (μ, t) ◦ (form(w), 1))(w) =
(Φ ◦ (form(w), 1) ◦ (μ, t))(w). As w | ¬μ, from Proposition 1, we have (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1) ◦ (μ, t))(w) =
(Φ ◦ (form(w), 1))(w) and (Φ ◦ (μ, t))(w) = Φ(w). So finally we have (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1))(w) ≥ Φ(w) + 1.
From the above we conclude that (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1))(w) ≥ Φ(w) + 1 if w ∈ Mod(Φ). And from B2, we have Mod(Φ ◦
(form(w), 1)) = {w}, hence we get (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1)◦ (form(w), 1))(w) ≥ (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1))(w)+1 ≥ Φ(w)+2. From
B5, we have (Φ ◦ (form(w), 1)◦ (form(w), 1))(w) = (Φ ◦ (form(w), 2))(w). Sowe get (Φ ◦ (form(w), 2))(w) ≥ Φ(w)+2.
Similarly, by induction, finally we get (Φ ◦ (form(w),m))(w) ≥ Φ(w) + m.
Step 2. We show that for w ∈ Mod(Φ), let mw = fΦ(¬form(w)) > 0, then (Φ ◦ (form(w), i))(w) = Φ(w) + i for
0 ≤ i ≤ mw .
First we prove that (Φ ◦ (form(w),mw)) = Φ(w) + mw for w ∈ Mod(Φ).
Let μ = form(w), as w ∈ Mod(Φ), it is easy to see that mw = fΦ(¬μ) > 0. From Proposition 2, we have Mod(Φ ◦
(μ,mw)) = Mod(Φ) ∪ {w}. Letw′ ∈ Mod(Φ), thenw,w′ are both models of Φ ◦ (μ,mw), we have (Φ ◦ (μ,mw))(w′) =
(Φ ◦ (μ,mw))(w). In addition, from Proposition 1, we have Φ(w′) = (Φ ◦ (μ,mw))(w′), thus
mw = fΦ(¬μ) = Φ(¬μ) − Φ(μ)
=maxw∗|¬μ(Φ(w∗)) − Φ(w)
= Φ(w′) − Φ(w)
= (Φ ◦ (μ,mw))(w′) − Φ(w)
= (Φ ◦ (μ,mw))(w) − Φ(w).
That is (Φ ◦ (μ,mw))(w) = Φ(w) + mw . And we also have Φ(w′) = Φ(w) + mw .
Now for 0 ≤ i < mw , we show (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) = Φ(w) + i. The situation that i = 0 follows directly from B0.
For situations 0 < i < mw , from Proposition 2, we have Mod(Φ ◦ (μ, i)) = Mod(Φ), so w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ, i)). Let
mi = fΦ◦(μ,i)(¬μ), similar to the case ofmw , we should have (Φ ◦ (μ, i) ◦ (μ,mi))(w) = (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) + mi.
From B5 and since
mi = fΦ◦(μ,i)(¬μ)
= (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(¬μ) − (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(μ)
= (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w′) − (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w)
= Φ(w) + mw − (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w),
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we get
(Φ ◦ (μ, i + Φ(w) + mw − (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w)))(w)
= (Φ ◦ (μ, i + mi))(w)
= (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) + mi
= Φ(w) + mw.
If (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) < Φ(w) + i, then i + Φ(w) + mw − (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) > mw , or we can write i + Φ(w) +
mw − (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) = mw + α where α > 0. Thus we should have Φ(w) + mw = (Φ ◦ (μ,mw + α))(w) =
(Φ ◦ (μ,mw) ◦ (μ, α))(w). But since w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,mw)) and B2, we haveMod(Φ ◦ (μ,mw) ◦ (μ, α)) = {w}which
implies that (Φ ◦ (μ,mw)◦ (μ, α))(w) > (Φ ◦ (μ,mw)◦ (μ, α))(w′) = Φ(w′) = Φ(w)+mw . It leads to a contradiction.
If (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) > Φ(w)+ i, then i+ Φ(w)+mw − (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) < mw , or we can write i+ Φ(w)+mw − (Φ ◦
(μ, i))(w) = mw − α where α > 0. Thus we should have Φ(w) + mw = (Φ ◦ (μ,mw − α))(w). But as mw − α < mw ,
from Proposition 2, we have w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,mw − α)) = Mod(Φ) while w′ ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,mw − α)) = Mod(Φ), so
we get (Φ ◦ (μ,mw − α))(w) < (Φ ◦ (μ,mw − α))(w′) = Φ(w′) = Φ(w) + mw which leads to a contradiction.
So finally we conclude that it should be (Φ ◦ (μ, i))(w) = Φ(w) + i.
Step 3. We show that forw ∈ Mod(Φ) and ∀n > mw = fΦ(¬form(w)), (Φ ◦ (form(w), n))(w) = Φ(w) + n still holds.
Following the proof in Step 2, we still let w′ ∈ Mod(Φ). From B6, we have Φ ◦ (form(w′), n) ◦ (form(w), n) = Φ ◦
(form(w), n) ◦ (form(w′), n).
From B2, we know that Mod(Φ ◦ (form(w′), n)) = {w′}, and in Step 1, we have shown that (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n))(w) ≥
Φ(w′) + n. Thus we have
fΦ◦(form(w′),n)(¬form(w))
= (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n))(¬form(w)) − (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n))(form(w))
= (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n))(w′) − (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n))(w)
≥ Φ(w′) + n − Φ(w)
> n,
so by the conclusion of Step 2, we have (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n) ◦ (form(w), n))(w) = (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n))(w) + n. But
from Proposition 1, we have (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n))(w) = Φ(w), hence we get (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n) ◦ (form(w), n))(w) =
Φ(w) + n. But (Φ ◦ (form(w′), n) ◦ (form(w), n))(w) = (Φ ◦ (form(w), n) ◦ (form(w′), n))(w), thus we get (Φ ◦
(form(w), n) ◦ (form(w′), n))(w) = Φ(w) + n. Still by Proposition 1, we have (Φ ◦ (form(w), n) ◦ (form(w′), n))(w) =
(Φ ◦ (form(w), n))(w). So finally we have (Φ ◦ (form(w), n))(w) = Φ(w) + n.
Step 4. We show that for any w′ ∈ Mod(Φ), we also have (Φ ◦ (form(w′),m))(w) = Φ(w′) + m form ≥ 0.
We only need to show that (Φ ◦ (form(w′),m))(w) = Φ(w′) + m form > 0 as the situationm = 0 is straightforward
from B0. Let w ∈ Mod(Φ) and letm∗ = m + fΦ(¬form(w)) = m + Φ(w′) − Φ(w).
From B6, we have Φ ◦ (form(w′),m) ◦ (form(w),m∗) = Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗) ◦ (form(w′),m).
From B5,Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗) = Φ ◦ (form(w), fΦ(¬form(w))) ◦ (form(w),m), then from Proposition 2 and B2, we have
Mod(Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗)) = {w}. As showed in Step 2 and Step 3, we have (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗))(w) = Φ(w)+m∗ and from
Proposition 1, we have (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗))(w′) = Φ(w′). Thus we get
fΦ◦(form(w),m∗)(¬form(w′))
= (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗))(¬form(w′)) − (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗))(form(w′))
= (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗))(w) − (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗))(w′)
= Φ(w) + m∗ − Φ(w′)
= Φ(w) + m + Φ(w′) − Φ(w) − Φ(w′)
= m,
then from Proposition 2, we haveMod(Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗)◦ (form(w′),m)) = {w,w′}. Hencewe have (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗)◦
(form(w′),m))(w′) = (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗) ◦ (form(w′),m))(w).
From Proposition 1, we have (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗) ◦ (form(w′),m))(w) = (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗))(w). Recall we already
have (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗))(w) = Φ(w) + m∗, we get (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗) ◦ (form(w′),m))(w) = Φ(w) + m∗, and then
we have (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗) ◦ (form(w′),m))(w′) = Φ(w) + m∗. As (Φ ◦ (form(w),m∗) ◦ (form(w′),m))(w′) = (Φ ◦
(form(w′),m)◦(form(w),m∗))(w′), we have (Φ◦(form(w′),m)◦(form(w),m∗))(w′) = Φ(w)+m∗. Still by Proposition 1,
we have (Φ ◦ (form(w′),m)◦ (form(w),m∗))(w′) = (Φ ◦ (form(w′),m))(w′). So we finally get (Φ ◦ (form(w′),m))(w′) =
Φ(w) + m∗ = Φ(w) + m + Φ(w′) − Φ(w) = Φ(w′) + m.
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Step 5. We show that for any w, (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + m.
From Steps 1–4, We already have (Φ ◦ (form(w),m))(w) = Φ(w) + m.
If w | μ, then from B4, we have (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = (Φ ◦ (form(w),m))(w) = Φ(w) + m.
If w | ¬μ, then from Proposition 1, we still have (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) = Φ(w) + (μ,m)(w) as (μ,m)(w) = 0.
So for any w, (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + m holds.
(⇐) Suppose we have (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + (μ,m)(w) for any Φ , μ,m and w.
B0 Φ ◦ (μ, 0) = Φ
For any w, we have (Φ ◦ (μ, 0))(w) = Φ(w) + (μ, 0)(w) = Φ(w), thus Φ ◦ (μ, 0) = Φ .
B1 If fΦ(μ) > m, thenΦ ◦ (¬μ,m) | μ; if fΦ(μ) < m, thenΦ ◦ (¬μ,m) | ¬μ; if fΦ(μ) = m, thenΦ ◦ (¬μ,m) | μ
and Φ ◦ (¬μ,m) | ¬μ.
As for w | μ, (Φ ◦ (¬μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) and for w | ¬μ, (Φ ◦ (¬μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + m, we have
fΦ(μ) − m
= Φ(μ) − Φ(¬μ) − m
= maxw|μ(Φ(w)) − maxw|¬μ(Φ(w) + m)
= maxw|μ((Φ ◦ (¬μ,m))(w)) − maxw|¬μ((Φ ◦ (¬μ,m))(w)),
so if fΦ(μ) > m, then maxw|μ((Φ ◦ (¬μ,m))(w)) > maxw|¬μ((Φ ◦ (¬μ,m))(w)), thus Mod(Φ ◦ (¬μ,m)) =
min(W,≤Φ◦(¬μ,w)) ⊆ Mod(μ)which implies Φ ◦ (¬μ,m) | μ. Similarly, if fΦ(μ) < m, we can infer Φ ◦ (¬μ,m) |¬μ. If fΦ(μ) = m, then maxw|μ((Φ ◦ (¬μ,m))(w)) = maxw|¬μ((Φ ◦ (¬μ,m))(w)), thus min(W,≤Φ◦(¬μ,w)) ∩
Mod(μ) = ∅ andmin(W,≤Φ◦(¬μ,w)) ∩ Mod(¬μ) = ∅which implies Φ ◦ (¬μ,m) | μ and Φ ◦ (¬μ,m) | ¬μ.
B2 If Φ ∧ μ is satisfiable, then Φ ◦ (μ,m) ≡ Φ ∧ μ.
We only need to showMod(Φ ∧ μ) ⊆ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)) andMod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)) ⊆ Mod(Φ ∧ μ).
1. Mod(Φ ∧ μ) ⊆ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)).
∀w ∈ Mod(Φ ∧ μ) and ∀w′, we have w ≥Φ w′ and (μ,m)(w) = m ≥ (μ,m)(w′), thus Φ(w) + (μ,m)(w) ≥
Φ(w′) + (μ,m)(w′) which is equivalent to w ≥Φ◦(μ,m) (w′). So w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)).
2. Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)) ⊆ Mod(Φ ∧ μ).
As Mod(Φ ∧ μ) is satisfiable, let w∗ ∈ Mod(Φ ∧ μ). ∀w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)), it should be (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) ≥
(Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w∗), orΦ(w)+ (μ,m)(w) ≥ Φ(w∗)+ (μ,m)(w∗). But asw∗ ∈ Mod(Φ ∧μ), we haveΦ(w) ≤ Φ(w∗)
and (μ,m)(w) ≤ (μ,m)(w∗). Therefore, it should be Φ(w) = Φ(w∗) and (μ,m)(w) = (μ,m)(w∗) which implies
w ∈ Mod(Φ) and w | μ, so w ∈ Mod(Φ ∧ μ).
B3 If μ is satisfiable, then Φ ◦ (μ,m) is satisfiable.
As (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + m ∈ Z , it is obvious.
B4 If Φ1(w1) = Φ2(w2) and (μ1,m)(w1) = (μ2, n)(w2), then (Φ1 ◦ (μ1,m))(w1) = (Φ2 ◦ (μ2, n))(w2).
(Φ1 ◦ (μ1,m))(w1) = Φ1(w1) + (μ1,m)(w1)
= Φ2(w2) + (μ2, n)(w2)
= (Φ2 ◦ (μ2, n))(w2).
B5 Φ ◦ (μ,m) ◦ (μ, n) = Φ ◦ (μ,m + n).
∀w, we have
(Φ ◦ (μ,m) ◦ (μ, n))(w) = (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) + n
= Φ(w) + m + n
= (Φ ◦ (μ,m + n))(w).
B6 Φ ◦ (μ,m) ◦ (ψ, n) = Φ ◦ (ψ, n) ◦ (μ,m).
It is easy to obtain that
(Φ ◦ (μ,m) ◦ (ψ, n))(w) = (Φ ◦ (ψ, n) ◦ (μ,m))(w)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Φ(w) + m + n for w | μ and w | ψ,
Φ(w) + m for w | μ and w | ψ,
Φ(w) + n for w | μ and w | ψ,
Φ(w) for w | μ and w | ψ.
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Proof of Theorem 2. (⇒) As B6* implies B6, we have ∀Φ,μ,m,w, (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + (μ,m)(w). Denote
W = {w1, . . . ,wn}, for any epistemic stateΦ , first we showΦ = (form(w1), Φ(w1))◦ · · · ◦ (form(wn), Φ(wn)). In fact, for
any wi, we have (form(wi), Φ(wi))(wi) = Φ(wi) and ∀j = i, (form(wj), Φ(wj))(wi) = 0. Hence from Theorem 1, we get
(form(w1), Φ(w1))(wi)◦· · ·◦(form(wn), Φ(wn))(wi) = (form(w1), Φ(w1))(wi)+· · ·+(form(wn), Φ(wn))(wi) = Φ(wi).
Thus we obtain Φ = (form(w1), Φ(w1)) ◦ · · · ◦ (form(wn), Φ(wn)). Therefore, for any w ∈ W , we get
(Φ ◦ Φ ′)(w)
= ((form(w1), Φ(w1)) ◦ · · · ◦ (form(wn), Φ(wn)) ◦ Φ ′)(w)
B6∗= ((form(w1), Φ(w1)) ◦ · · · ◦ (form(wn−1), Φ(wn−1)) ◦ Φ ′ ◦ (form(wn), Φ(wn)))(w)
B6∗= . . .
B6∗= (Φ ′ ◦ (form(w1), Φ(w1)) ◦ · · · ◦ (form(wn), Φ(wn)))(w)
= (Φ ′ ◦ (form(w1), Φ(w1)) ◦ · · · ◦ (form(wn−1), Φ(wn−1)))(w)
+(form(wn), Φ(wn))(w)
= . . .
= Φ ′(w) + (form(w1), Φ(w1))(w) + · · · + (form(wn), Φ(wn))(w)
= Φ ′(w) + Φ(w).
So for any w, (Φ ◦ Φ ′)(w) = Φ(w) + Φ ′(w) holds.
(⇐) Suppose for anyw, (Φ ◦ Φ ′)(w) = Φ(w)+ Φ ′(w) holds. As postulates B0–B5 are already proved to be satisfied in
Theorem 1, here we only need to show B6* holds. This is straightforward and omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, ∀w ∈ W , κ(w) = maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − Φ(w) ≥ 0 and there exists some w′ ∈ Mod(Φ) that
κ(w′) = 0.
Second, ∀μ, we have
κ(μ) = maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − Φ(μ)
= maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − maxw|μ(Φ(w))
= maxw∈W (Φ(w)) + minw|μ(−Φ(w))
= minw|μ(maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − Φ(w))
= minw|μ(κ(w)).
Thus, κ is a valid ordinal conditional function.
Proof of Theorem 3.We have
κΦ(w) + κμ(w) − minw∗∈W (κΦ(w∗) + κμ(w∗))
= maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − Φ(w) + maxw∈W ((μ,m)(w)) − (μ,m)(w)
−minw∗∈W (maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − Φ(w∗) + maxw∈W ((μ,m)(w)) − (μ,m)(w∗))
= maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − Φ(w) + maxw∈W ((μ,m)(w)) − (μ,m)(w)
−maxw∈W (Φ(w)) − maxw∈W ((μ,m)(w)) − minw∗∈W (−Φ(w∗) − (μ,m)(w∗))
= −Φ(w) − (μ,m)(w) + maxw∗∈W (Φ(w∗) + (μ,m)(w∗))
= maxw∈W (Φ(w) + (μ,m)(w)) − Φ(w) − (μ,m)(w)
= maxw∈W ((Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w)) − (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w)
= κΦ◦μ(w).
Proof of Theorem 6. First, we define theΦ as follows:
w1 Φ w2 if Φ(w1) ≥ Φ(w2). Conventionally, w1 ≺Φ w2 iff w1 Φ w2 and w2 Φ w1, and w1 =Φ w2 iff w1 Φ w2
and w2 Φ w1.
Obviously,Φ is total, reflexive, and transitive, thus it is a total pre-order.
Second, we show that the assignment mapping from each Φ toΦ is faithful:
1. w1,w2 | Φ only if w1 =Φ w2.
w1,w2 | Φ implies that Φ(w1) = Φ(w2) = maxw∈W (Φ(w)), thus we have w1 =Φ w2.
J. Ma, W. Liu / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 917–934 933
2. w1 | Φ and w2 | Φ only if w1 ≺Φ w2.
w1 | Φ andw2 | Φ implies thatΦ(w1) = maxw∈W (Φ(w)) andΦ(w2) < maxw∈W (Φ(w)), thusΦ(w1) > Φ(w2),
so we have w1 ≺Φ w2.
3. Φ = Ψ only ifΦ=Ψ .
Follows immediately from the definition of epistemic states and the definition ofΦ andΨ .
Third, we show thatMod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)) = min(Mod(μ),Φ) holds.
Follows immediately when μ is not satisfiable. Suppose μ is satisfiable.
1. Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)) ⊆ min(Mod(μ),Φ).
Let ∀w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)), it should be w | μ. Otherwise let any w′ | μ, we have (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) =
Φ(w) + (μ,m)(w) = Φ(w) < m∗ + Φ(w′) ≤ Φ(w′) + (μ,m)(w′). Thus w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)) which is a
contradiction. So w | μ. Then as (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) ≥ (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w′), we have Φ(w) ≥ Φ(w′), so w Φ w′ for
any w′ | μ, hence w ∈ min(Mod(μ),Φ).
2. min(Mod(μ),Φ) ⊆ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)).
Let ∀w ∈ min(Mod(μ),Φ), then for any w′ | μ, we have (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + m ≥ Φ(w′) + m =
(Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w′). And for any w′′ | ¬μ, we have (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + m > Φ(w′′) = (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w′′).
Thus w ∈ Mod(Φ ◦ (μ,m)).
Proof of Theorem 7
CR1* If w1 | μ and w2 | μ, then w1 Φ w2 iff w1 Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
Follows immediately from (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + m for any w | μ.
CR2* If w1 | ¬μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 Φ w2 iff w1 Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
Follows immediately from (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w) = Φ(w) + m for any w | μ.
CR3* If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 ≺Φ w2 only if w1 ≺Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
As (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w1) = Φ(w1) + m > Φ(w2), it is straightforward.
CR4* If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 Φ w2 only if w1 Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
As (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w1) = Φ(w1) + m > Φ(w2), it is straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 8
RecR* If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 ≺Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
As (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w1) = Φ(w1) + m > Φ(w2), it is straightforward.
IndR* If w1 | μ and w2 | ¬μ, then w1 Φ w2 only if w1 ≺Φ◦(μ,m) w2.
As (Φ ◦ (μ,m))(w1) = Φ(w1) + m > Φ(w2), it is straightforward.
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